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The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) 
has granted large tracts of land for agricultural 
investment under the economic land concession 
(ELC) scheme, set out in the 2001 Land Law. 
ELCs were seen as a key tool to put sections of state 
land into more productive economic use and thus 
create local jobs and incomes. They have commonly 
been used for agro-industrial plantations and agro-
processing for export. As of June 2012, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries had granted 
ELCs covering a total area of 1,204,750 hectares to 
118 companies (MAFF 2013). However, as Open 
Development Cambodia (2015) reports, when 
concessions issued by other government agencies 
such as the Ministry of Environment (MOE) are 
taken into account, the figure is closer to 2 million 
hectares. ELC areas are shown on Figure 1. 
In May 2012, the government announced 
a moratorium on granting new  ELCs. An 
interministerial committee was subsequently 
formed to conduct a nationwide review of existing 
concessions. The aim was to cancel projects that 
did not abide by the law or 
ELC contracts. Notably, 
1.2 million hectares, some 
revoked from ELCs, were 
redistributed in 2013 and 
2014 to more than 710,000 
smallholders as private 
ownerships (MLMUPC 2014). 
Through the MOE and 
MAFF, the government has 
enforced ELC agreements 
and cancelled or downsized 
at least 40 ELCs, releasing 
another 231,000 hectares 
between January and 
March 2015.  
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Despite the reduction of new ELCs, Cambodia’s 
excessive large-scale state land concessions have 
adversely affected the livelihoods and land tenure 
rights of local people, threatening the country’s rich 
biodiversity and restricting access to land especially 
for new farmer households. Although the suspension 
on granting new ELCs was initially lauded, there has 
been a degree of scepticism as to its practical effect 
and intended scope. 
The following sections outline key steps for granting 
new land concessions (if any) and improving the 
efficiency of existing ELCs (or similar large-scale 
state land licences). Also highlighted are other key 
elements such as state land identification, land use 
management, law enforcement and taxation.
1.  Granting of new land concessions 
Prepare national or regional land use and 
development master plans, giving high priority 
to ecosystem sustainability, biodiversity 
preservation and livelihood needs and land rights 
of indigenous people and local residents. When 
areas deemed important for these uses have 
been designated and demarcated, remaining 
state land can be used for immediate and long-
term economic development such as commercial 
agriculture, plantations, hydropower, mining, 
agro-industry and infrastructure projects. 
This will require a multidisciplinary approach, 
extensive technical assistance and stakeholder 
consultation, and thus implementation could 
take several years. 
Produce a map of cultivable state land by 
classifying the areas left for agriculture, mining 
and economic development according to natural 
endowments such as soil quality, soil moisture, 
climatic conditions, elevation, water resources, 
and mineral potential. This activity could also 
take several years or even longer depending on 
availability of technical and financial resources.
Allocate disposable state land suitable for 
agriculture for (i) land poor or landless 
households to use and then own free of charge 
(through social land concession programs), or 
(ii) for perpetual leasehold by both smallholders 
and large-scale investors (through competitive 
solicited proposals for ELCs or other state land 
development schemes). 
Mark up cultivable state land allocated for 
leasehold (but not freehold or social land 
concession) preferably into small plots of a 
few hundred hectares or less, and then put the 
plots up for public bidding before granting 
perpetual lease or ELC. Smallholders’ or farming 
households’ access to land (from several to 
dozens of hectares) for subleasing or contract 
farming should be unrestricted and convenient. 
The aim is to increase local investors/farmers’ 
access to land and achieve more equitable 
land distribution. Non-Cambodians or foreign 
investors should not be granted any further 
“technically free” land concessions.
Simplify the administration and collection of 
tax revenues from state land by charging a set 
amount per hectare, payable annually whether 
or not the land is cultivated. This will encourage 
lessees/concessionaires to optimise land use 
and productivity. The annual lease/royalty rate 
is to be determined at public auctions or set for 
a predetermined period of five years, adjustable 
thereafter. The duration of the lease/concession 
term can be 10 years, 25 years, 35 years, 50 
years or longer depending on the life of the crop 
and according to the provisions of the lease/
concession contract or development purpose. 
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2. Improving the efficiency of existing ELCs 
Majority of ELCs have not been cultivated as 
planned or agreed in the contract. A strict review 
should be carried out and contract requirements 
enforced. Concession lands should be 
confiscated from those who have breached the 
contract or broken the law. Unused, underused 
and misused state land could be allocated for 
conservation or redistribution as social land 
concessions.
Lack of labour especially in remote areas hinders 
ELC companies’ operations. One option is for 
the Ministry of Labour to set a minimum wage 
for workers on labour-intensive plantations 
(e.g. rubber, oil palm and black pepper) that is 
higher than prevailing market rates. This would 
encourage adequate numbers of Cambodian 
workers to take up jobs in remote areas. 
Alternatively, ELC companies should be required 
to provide their workers with reasonable living 
conditions including housing, food, clothing and 
medical care. 
Management of migrants’ employment and 
settlements. Labour Law compliance should be 
enforced on plantations and other large farms. 
Foreign workers must possess a valid work 
permit and abide by the terms set in immigration 
and labour laws. Additional regulatory and 
administrative measures may be needed to 
safeguard against long-term or permanent 
settlement of immigrants in remote plantations, 
especially those in border areas. The Ministry 
of Labour and the Ministry of Interior should 
jointly ensure the monitoring and control of 
settlers in ELCs. 
Taxation to encourage efficient and productive 
land use. Annual property tax and land tax for 
underused or unused ELCs need to be reviewed. 
For transparent, predictable and convenient 
declaration and collection, these taxes should be 
based on clear price zoning set by the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance in consultation with the 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning 
and Construction. 
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About the DRF
The Development Research Forum (DRF) of Cambodia was established following the All-Partners Forum 
organised by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada in September 2007. 
The DRF vision is of a high capacity, professional and vibrant Cambodian development research community. 
Its goal is to support and strengthen the capacity of the Cambodian development research community. 
The DRF partnership involves the Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), Cambodian 
Economic Association (CEA), Learning Institute (LI), National Institute of Public Health (NIPH), Royal 
University of Agriculture (RUA), Royal University of Phnom Penh (RUPP), Supreme National Economic 
Council (SNEC) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada.
In DRF Phase II 2012-15, with financial support from IDRC, the partners intend to work together to build 
research culture and capacity and to share research knowledge through workshops, policy roundtables 
and symposiums as well as training and online discussion (www.drfcambodia.net) on six research themes: 
growth and inclusiveness, governance of natural resources, social policy on education, social policy on 
health, agricultural development, and Cambodia and its region.
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List of Acronyms
ELC Economic Land Concession 
MOE Ministry of Environment
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
